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Abstract
The dominant, individualistic understanding of autonomy that features in clinical practice and research is underpinned by
the idea that people are, in their ideal form, independent, self-interested and rational gain-maximising decision-makers.
In recent decades, this paradigm has been challenged from various disciplinary and intellectual directions. Proponents of
‘relational autonomy’ in particular have argued that people’s identities, needs, interests – and indeed autonomy – are
always also shaped by their relations to others. Yet, despite the pronounced and nuanced critique directed at an
individualistic understanding of autonomy, this critique has had very little effect on ethical and legal instruments in clinical
practice and research so far. In this article, we use four case studies to explore to what extent, if at all, relational
autonomy can provide solutions to ethical and practical problems in clinical practice and research. We conclude that
certain forms of relational autonomy can have a tangible and positive impact on clinical practice and research. These
solutions leave the ultimate decision to the person most affected, but encourage and facilitate the consideration of this
person’s care and responsibility for connected others.
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Introduction
Respect for autonomy is one of the most important
values guiding clinical practice and research in many
parts of the world.1,a At the same time, it is closely
connected to a particularly Western, post-
Enlightenment idea that an adult person is a bounded
individual who is able to live her life freely in accord-
ance with her self-chosen plan, and ideally independ-
ently from controlling inﬂuences.2–8 In the ﬁeld of
medicine, the principle of personal autonomy was
raised as a pillar in clinical research ethics beginning
in the mid-20th century. This was, to a large extent, a
response to the Nazi atrocities in the name of medical
research. It is reﬂected, for example, in the Nuremberg
Code and especially its ﬁrst point that the ‘voluntary
consent of the human subject is absolutely essential’,
with ‘suﬃcient knowledge and comprehension of the
elements of the subject matter involved’ so as ‘to
enable him to make an understanding and enlightened
decision’.9 In the domain of Western biomedicine, the
epitome of personal autonomy is a patient expressing a
decision that she has come to autonomously and
independently. The importance of such an understand-
ing of autonomy – which we call ‘individualistic auton-
omy’ – within law and clinical ethics is summarised in
the words of the respected American judge, Benjamin
Cardozo: ‘Every human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
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his body; and a surgeon who performs an operation
without his patient’s consent, commits an assault’.10
Many within and outside of the ﬁeld of medicine see
such an individualistic understanding of autonomy as a
positive development, ‘serv[ing] as a corrective to the
highly paternalistic doctor-patient relationship’11 that
has dominated the history of Western medicine.12
Besides its constitutive role in conceptualising person-
hood in the West, individualistic autonomy has
practical advantages, especially for law. As King and
Moulton argue, by establishing a seemingly clear rule
for how and by whom decisions should be made (i.e.
by the aﬀected patient/participant), individualistic
autonomy provides a seemingly simple recipe for the
protection of patient autonomy. Such an easy-to-
follow recipe eases burdens on healthcare professionals
in several ways:
1) protecting autonomy is more easily aligned with
existing legal principles and precedents; 2) promoting
patient autonomy may relieve the physician of some
responsibility and liability; 3) emphasizing patient
autonomy coincides with and supports the recent shift
towards consumerism in medicine; and 4) promoting
autonomy appears less paternalistic than beneﬁcence,
but still permits physicians to control the ﬂow of
information.13
This said, the individualistic conception of autonomy
as the self-rule of independent, self-determining and
rational (in the sense of strategic rationality) individ-
uals has faced theoretical challenge in recent dec-
ades.14,15 One strand of critique has been posited by
feminist and communitarian scholars, who argue that
an individualistic understanding of autonomy is both
insuﬃcient to capture the breadth of human interests
and agency, and inconsistent with other important
values.3,16–20 Critics argue that understandings of
autonomy should accommodate the fact that people
are rarely, if ever, fully independent individuals.
Instead, we are relational beings whose identities and
interests are shaped by our connections to others.
In other words, it is through relations to our human,
natural and artefactual environments that we come to
develop our sense of identity as well as capacity for
exercising self-determination. Some scholars
advocating such a relational conception of autonomy
further posit that the individualistic conception causes
tangible problems in healthcare and research.21,22 These
problems range from legal and ethical barriers to data
use, to increasing suﬀering for patients at the end of
their lives.23,24
Interestingly, the deep and nuanced theoretical con-
tributions that challenge such an individualistic concep-
tion of autonomy and formulate alternatives have had
little impact on actual clinical practice and research.
Looking at the English legal context in healthcare, for
instance, Gilbar and Miola observe that ‘the emergence
of relational autonomy has not yet yielded a meaning-
ful legal response to the impact of the patient’s cultural
background on the decision-making process, thus creat-
ing diﬃculties for clinicians and some patients to make
decisions about treatment’.25 Similarly, McLean notes
the law’s ongoing strong focus on the individual’s deci-
sion-making capacity and her individual right thereof to
exercise in decision-making.26 Despite her criticisms of
the law’s extant approach, however, McLean is equally
concerned that emphasising ‘the importance of inter-
relatedness can result in an undue focus on the interest
of others and this is evident, for example, when the
decisions of pregnant women are disregarded in the
interests of a future child’. Placed in the ‘wrong’
hands, relational accounts ‘can be manipulated to
defeat autonomous choice’,26 meaning that, in
McLean’s speciﬁc example, it unjustly overrules the
interests of the pregnant woman.
The fear of infringing individual rights and interests
by employing a diﬀerent understanding of autonomy
may be an important reason for the fact that the
wide-ranging and nuanced literature on relational
autonomy has remained without much impact on prac-
tice so far. But are there additional reasons for the gap
between theory and practice? Is relational autonomy a
notion that compels in the abstract but fails the test of
practice? Or can relational autonomy help to address
some of the challenges that clinical practice and
research are facing, and if so, how? These are the ques-
tions that the remainder of this article seeks to address.
As a growing number of bioethicists and social scien-
tists invoke a ‘relational turn’ that encourages us to
move beyond individualistic towards more relational
and/or collective perspectives,27–31 the time is ripe to
put relational autonomy to the test, exploring what it
can do when applied to clinical practice and research.
In so doing, we emphasise our support of autonomy as
a fundamental ethical principle, albeit one that requires
reconﬁguration. First, we outline the individualistic
conception of autonomy and then contrast this with a
summary of the theoretical challenge posited by scho-
lars advocating relational autonomy. Observing that
instances of operationalising relational autonomy in
clinical practice and research are few, we then present
four case studies and discuss whether (and if so, how)
relational autonomy can change the way we think
about and address practical challenges.
Individualistic notions of autonomy
The individualistic notion of autonomy as enlightened
self-determination, ﬁrst developed by John Stuart Mill
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in his 1869 essay On Liberty,32 was famously expressed
by Isaiah Berlin as follows:
I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not
on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the
instrument of my own, not of other men’s, acts of will. I
wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by
reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own,
not by causes which aﬀect me, as it were, from
outside.33
Common understandings of autonomy in bioethics
are strongly inﬂuenced by this individualistic notion,
not least because some of the earliest and most power-
ful institutions of bioethics were born in the heartland
of individualistic autonomy – the United States.34,35
Because of this strong emphasis on individual inde-
pendence in the understanding of personal autonomy
within bioethics, negative freedom – namely the free-
dom from interference by others33 – plays a central role
in its conceptualisation, instead of the ‘positive’ factors
and circumstances that need to be in place for people to
lead healthy, digniﬁed and meaningful lives.
Such a ‘negative’ understanding of autonomy is fun-
damentally a device to protect individuals from intru-
sion by others,33 which in turn reinforces the notion
that people are independent decision-makers. In prac-
tice, this tends to take the form of minimal or ‘thin’
autonomy, where the mere ability to exercise individual
choice is taken to be autonomous choice.
In the context of clinical practice and research,
respect for autonomy is connected closely to the value
of privacy and notion, or practice, of consent.36 As
Onora O’Neill observes: ‘For proponents of autonomy
rights for patients, the physician’s obligations to the
patient of disclosure, seeking consent, conﬁdentiality,
and privacy are established primarily (and perhaps
exclusively) by the principle of respect for autonomy’.37
Voluntary, informed consent acts as the process by
which one (legally) autonomous individual allows or
refuses another individual to perform an action on or
relating to her.
But some authors have challenged the strong link
between consent and autonomy, though not always
explicitly, through the prism of individualism versus
relationality.38 Because a person can fail to give her
consent to a certain course of treatment and yet still
be fully autonomous with respect to her decision to
pursue the course of treatment, it can be argued that
the ethical foundation of consent is really concern for
human well-being, though the case for medical pater-
nalism gains strength in arguing this position.
The law, particularly in the context of judicial deci-
sions, tends to focus on other areas of concern, includ-
ing policy and the desire to balance the interests of
patients or participants with other parties (namely
healthcare professionals). As such, it often espouses a
generalised, objective standard of the ‘reasonable
patient’ – asking what information is necessary for an
average ‘reasonable’ patient, rather than a speciﬁc
patient – to make an enlightened decision concerning
the medical procedure at hand.26,39 This said, the recent
UK Supreme Court decision of Montgomery v
Lanarkshire Health Board acknowledges that doctors
have a duty to take reasonable care to ensure a patient
is aware of any ‘material risks’ involved in any recom-
mended treatment.40 ‘Material risks’ can refer either:
(a) to risks that a reasonable person in the position of
the patient would likely attach signiﬁcance to, or (b) to
risks that the doctor should reasonably be aware that
the particular patient would be likely to attach signiﬁ-
cance to.41 Despite greater judicial recognition of sub-
jective notions of risk, the Montgomery decision still
grounds the issue of consent vis-a-vis the individual,
speciﬁc patient and her decision-making ability. As
McLean observes:
It is the decision-making aspect of autonomy that dom-
inates in law; (legally deﬁned) decision-making ability
predicts the status of competence and thereby the right
to act autonomously. The individual is supreme, and
once judged competent is entitled to make decisions on
the basis of his or her own concerns and interests, sub-
ject only to the caveat that they do not harm third
parties. This individualistic model of autonomy is lar-
gely unconcerned with what the decision is; rather, it is
interested in the right to make it.26
Moreover, the law’s focus on consent is on assessing
the individual’s status as competent (again in a legal
sense), rather than on dialogical and iterative mech-
anisms that engage the person to assess the back-
ground psychological aspects that assure information
is complete enough to enable an informed, ‘autono-
mous’ decision. Consequently, ‘shared decision-
making’ that values the dialogue between healthcare
professionals and patients or participants – and
others – in the consent process is side-lined in
the law of many jurisdictions. Instead, a formulaic
approach to consent predominates, assuming that
patients can be given information and then make an
independent decision on the basis of this information.
As Spatz and colleagues observe in the American con-
text (but which can be applied to many other juris-
dictions as well):
[W]ith the exception of 1 state, Washington, that expli-
citly recognizes shared decision making as an alterna-
tive to the traditional consent process, the law has yet
to promote a process that truly supports a reasonable-
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patient–centered standard through shared decision
making.39
The legal position reﬂects the emphasis that an indi-
vidualistic understanding of autonomy places on who
counts as an autonomous person and the procedural
conditions of exercising choice, rather than on what
constitutes a good decision. Proponents of individual-
istic autonomy value the assertion and exercise of
choice to do something, for example, to participate in
a research study or to agree to have surgery performed.
In the words of Katri Lo˜hmus:
This form of autonomy pays attention to the proced-
ural conditions of one’s choices, how a decision is made
rather than what is decided. As long as certain neces-
sary conditions on the decision-making process are in
place, the choice counts as autonomous, regardless of
the value (or lack of value) of the object chosen. As a
result, the primary concern and focus for this type of
autonomy shifts to the chooser – we have to be deemed
competent to make autonomous choices.42
Moreover, consent is generally seen – in the ‘default’
setting – as a decision that is and should be expressed
by one person, namely the patient or research partici-
pant.24 To illustrate this, the current version of the
Declaration of Helsinki states at Article 25 that:
‘Participation by individuals capable of giving informed
consent as subjects in medical research must be volun-
tary. Although it may be appropriate to consult family
members or community leaders, no individual capable
of giving informed consent may be enrolled in a
research study unless he or she freely agrees’.43 This
statement acknowledges that a person’s interests are
connected to other people and groups and could thus
be read as a call for a degree of relational autonomy.
But equally it can be seen to underscore individualistic
autonomy, suggesting that although others may have
interests, it is ultimately only the individual’s decision
(expressed through free agreement) that matters. This
observation of the ‘default’ setting of personal auton-
omy is not a trivial point, as it highlights, again, the
close relation between the idea of consent and Western
individualism.8
Relational autonomy
In recent decades, the individualistic conception of
autonomy as atomistic and rational ‘self-rule’ has
come under theoretical challenge, particularly by scho-
lars advocating a more relational form of autonomy.
Not independence, but interdependence, is at the heart
of relational notions of autonomy: social surroundings
and relationships enable us to ﬂourish and develop a
robust capacity for self-determination and identity
formation.
Feminist and communitarian scholars in particular
have taken issue with individualistic, that is, atomistic
autonomy – rather than autonomy itself – for ignoring
values such as mutual responsibility, cooperation and
care towards others – values seen as playing a crucial
role in important areas of decision-making such as
healthcare and research. Individualistic autonomy, in
these scholars’ view, oﬀers an impoverished or incom-
plete view of the human condition. Instead, they have
encouraged us to reconceptualise what autonomy
means, and therefore what it demands from us and
others. Relational autonomy can be viewed as a con-
ception of autonomy that places the individual in a
socially embedded network of others. Relationships
(with family, community and society), responsibility,
care and interdependence are key attributes of rela-
tional autonomy: people develop their sense of self
and form capacities and life plans through the relation-
ships they forge on a daily and long-term basis.
Relational autonomy asserts, therefore, that social sur-
roundings and relationships are crucial for developing
autonomy, and encourages us to act in ways guided by
an ethic of trust and care.44,45
This said, it remains unclear what exactly constitutes
a ‘relational autonomy response’ to individualistic
autonomy in practice. Two important reasons for this
may be lack of consensus about the analytic and nor-
mative value of relationality, and diﬃculties regarding
the question of how to achieve the consensus. Most
people would consider social relations to be important
for human ﬂourishing; not even the ﬁercest supporters
of the rational choice paradigm and individualistic
autonomy would deny that. Where views diverge, how-
ever, is the question of whether we should treat the
statement that ‘relations are important to human
beings’ merely as the description of a social fact, or
whether it should have deeper analytical and also nor-
mative implications.b Similarly, just as there are diﬀer-
ent views on the analytic implications of the importance
of relations to others for human beings, positions vary
on whether relationality should have normative impli-
cations on practice. The ethic of care approach, for
example, embodies the position that relationality does
have normative implications on how we treat
people.48–52
The picture is complicated further by the multitude
of relational accounts of autonomy. They range from
understanding relational autonomy foremost as a
reminder for practitioners to critically reﬂect on the
limits of their and other people’s autonomy,53 to
giving more decisional space to family members and a
patient’s or research participant’s signiﬁcant others
in medical decision-making,54,55 to approaches that
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treat relational autonomy as a justiﬁcation to challenge
decisions that people make that seem, for one reason or
another, problematic.29,56
This said, it is possible to distinguish between two
broad strands of thought on relational autonomy.19
The so-called ‘causal view’ posits that an individual
faces external constraints that cause alterations to her
free choice and scope of possible actions. To exercise
her autonomy, the individual must remain situated in a
web of relations; absent relations, she lacks autonomy.
However, in such a causal understanding, autonomy
itself need not be determined by social conditions. It
would be possible, within this framework, to under-
stand autonomy in an individualistic manner: while
social conditions in the background enable autonomy
in a more general sense, determining whether someone
acts autonomously in a speciﬁc situation depends on
their internal psychological state or capacities. The
‘constitutive view’, in contrast, does not treat social
conditions merely as a background condition for
autonomy, but posits that people are directly consti-
tuted by their relations and concerns for others.45
Here, autonomy is imbricated with interpersonal rela-
tions and social conditions. What both of these
accounts share is that they posit that conceptions of
autonomy must pay heed at some level to external
social conditions.
But, as mentioned in the Introduction, practical clar-
ity fails to emerge from this theoretical discussion.
In the process of making the conceptual work on rela-
tional autonomy relevant for practice, the following
questions are of key importance: What are the bound-
aries of a person? Should or must there be any external
conditions set around these boundaries? What is ‘exter-
nal’ to a person if all her relations are somehow part of
her? Should we consider only the patients’ family,
friends and others as the ‘relations’ relevant to rela-
tional autonomy, or does her healthcare professional
(e.g. doctor, nurse) – or the researcher – count as
well? If so, what would this look like in practice? And
what about close relationships that seem abusive or
exploitative? Moreover, can relational autonomy be
operationalised in law, which at least in the West has
been shaped by methodological individualism – one
body, one mind, one person? More simply, what work
can relational autonomy do for us as participants,
patients, clinicians, researchers, policymakers and as
citizens?
There have been surprisingly few attempts to trans-
late the rich and nuanced theoretical critique of the
individualistic notion of individual autonomy into
new approaches and tools for decision-making in clin-
ical practice and research. In the following section, we
present four case studies as thought experiments,
querying whether and how re-thinking the individual
by considering the ‘social’ in decision-making processes
can allow us to move beyond manifestations of individ-
ual autonomy in the healthcare and research context.
Given the extant lack of practical clarity, our key ques-
tion is: in the context of speciﬁc healthcare practices,
how does a relational autonomy approach help to
reframe the existing impasse, and what are the new
dilemmas that it raises?
Case studies: Can relational autonomy
help?
Case 1: Re-contacting patients with new genomic
and health findings
The availability of technologies to analyse genetic
material quickly and relatively inexpensively raises
important issues related to the communication of the
potential health signiﬁcance of new ﬁndings, such as
new information about the natural history of a condi-
tion; improved diagnostics; new information about pre-
viously uncertain test results; or reclassiﬁcation of a
variant on the basis of which decisions have been
made. Speciﬁcally, questions arise about whether
healthcare professionals, such as clinical genetics spe-
cialists, should re-contact former patients when new
ﬁndings emerge. No professional consensus has been
reached on whether such a responsibility to former
patients exists, and how it might enhance or interfere
with patient autonomy. Interestingly, in the ethics of
clinical genetics literature, the ‘right not to know’ has
been developed as an oﬀshoot of (individualistic)
autonomy.57,58 An individualistic understanding of
autonomy sets up a dilemma here in that it suggests a
particularly individual-centred understanding of rights
and responsibilities that may lead to diﬃculties for a
healthcare practitioner whose view of her own respon-
sibility may conﬂict with the views of her patient,
including her ‘right not to know’. In this case, patients
may or may not want to be re-contacted, as individual
and family sensitivities may be involved, and respecting
their ‘right not to know’ may put the conscientious
healthcare professional in an uncomfortable position
when he or she feels that certain information should
be shared, and remains uncertain what her responsibil-
ities involve.
Because of these diﬃculties, currently there is no
professional consensus in clinical genetics about
whether, and how, former patients should be re-con-
tacted when new genetic information relevant to them
or their family members comes to light. The only guide-
line currently available is a statement originally pub-
lished in 1999 by the American College of Medical
Genetics.59 This document highlights the logistical dif-
ﬁculties of re-contacting former patients, and identiﬁes
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the primary care provider – the specialist tasked to pro-
vide continuing care, such as a family physician or
General Practitioner (GP) – as the principal responsible
healthcare provider to alert patients to the potential
need for re-contact. Genetic service providers would
be responsible for clinical updates to patients in the
cases in which they are oﬀering continuing care. The
statement also suggests that patients should be appro-
priately advised to update their primary care provider
or the genetic service provider if relevant changes in
their lives occur, such as pregnancy.59 The 2007 revision
of the statement recognises that with the uptake of next
generation sequencing, testing laboratories may now be
in a position to know about changes in interpretation of
variants whose signiﬁcance had been previously
unknown, or about reclassiﬁcations of previously clas-
siﬁed variants – and should make an eﬀort to contact
relevant healthcare providers if new information
changes the previous clinical interpretation of a
sequence variant.60
In addition to not providing an answer to whether,
and if so how, re-contacting should be understood as
appropriate clinical practice, individualistic notions of
autonomy and privacy have not led to practical solu-
tions to these questions.61 As Dheensa and colleagues
observe, current understandings of information-sharing
in genetic medicine are ‘based on an inaccurate concep-
tualisation of patients as separate from others, free
from social or familial constraints’.30 Can a relational
autonomy approach help here?
The Mainstreaming Genetics: Re-contacting Patients
in a Dynamic Healthcare Environment projectc in the
UK has found that patients hold expectations that
they will be re-contacted, while healthcare providers
express concern about the availability of resources to
do so. Further, the project found that most clinical
genetics services currently do re-contact patients, but
not on a systematic basis.62 The project is considering
proposing a ‘partnership’ model for responsibility for
re-contacting63 that respects both the ‘right not to
know’ of the former patient (if this is what the patient
wants), and the relational autonomy of the patient,
which includes relationships with the healthcare pro-
vider and health system as well as with family members.
In the partnership model, the clinician consults with
her patients at the initiation of the clinical relationship
about sharing responsibility to keep up-to-date about
new ﬁndings and relevant information and communi-
cating that information to biologically relevant others.
The point here is not just to record preferences, but to
engage in a dialogue about expectations and under-
standings. In this model, there is reciprocity of rights
and responsibilities: the clinician has the responsibility
to hold and interpret genetic data and the patient is
responsible for ‘triggering’ the request for review of
information by maintaining periodic contact with the
clinic and informing them of potentially relevant life
changes. This means that patients retain control over
the possibility of receiving information concerning
updates about their condition or genetics, respecting
their personal autonomy (which can be understood to
include the ‘right not to know’). At the same time, this
solution could be seen as employing relational auton-
omy where patients are seen as embedded within rela-
tions that include responsibility and accountability to
both themselves and others (including, but not limited
to, biological relatives), and where such relations also
involve the healthcare professional with whom the par-
ameters of the partnership would be negotiated. The
responsibility to communicate information to con-
nected others would be negotiated between the patient
and clinician, who share responsibility to consult with
connected others in the process of communicating
updates, meaning that no ‘one size ﬁts all’ recommen-
dation or guideline can be made. There is reason to
argue here that championing a shared decision-
making model, as in this partnership approach, follows
from a relational approach to autonomy, or at least
respects the patient as being autonomous in a relational
sense.64
This case highlights, and indeed is complicated by,
the problem of potentially competing preferences of
third parties. The healthcare provider may perceive a
duty to warn a third party of a genetic ﬁnding relevant
to their health, against the wishes of the patient with
whom they have negotiated a partnership. What does
relational autonomy have to say about a duty to warn
third parties?
Relational autonomy recognises that the patient is
not only embedded within relations with her healthcare
provider and with her potentially interested relatives,
but also that her interests and needs and indeed her
autonomy are partly shaped by these relations. It also
requires that relationality is acknowledged in the part-
nership negotiations that will take place with the
healthcare provider, to both enhance the wellbeing of
the patient herself, and to include potential duties to
third parties. Relational autonomy does not require the
patient to suﬀer harm in order to respect the prefer-
ences of a third party, but rather to understand those
preferences and take them into account (as Beauchamp
and Childress1 discuss in the ‘obligation to rescue’).
Case 2: Sharing genetic information to benefit
patients’ relatives
In clinical genetics, questions about relational auton-
omy are particularly pertinent because genetic informa-
tion is, by its very nature, shared, and emblematic of
people’s relations to others. Nevertheless, clinicians
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who order genetic tests frequently encounter patients
who have not discussed the possibility of a higher famil-
ial risk with family members.65 Consider, for example,
the following:
A patient, John Smith, has early-onset heart disease.
Investigations in a cardiogenetics clinic show that he
has Familial Hypercholesterolaemia (FH) and a patho-
genic LDLR gene mutation, i.e. a change in this gene
that has caused his condition. Two years later, Jeﬀ
Smith is referred to cardiogenetics because he knows
about a family history of heart attacks. He wants to
know his risk and that of his children. After providing
his family history, the clinician realises that Jeﬀ is bio-
logically related to John, and that the heart attacks in
both families might be attributed to FH.
In some cases, patients explicitly refuse to inform family
members or to allow clinicians to do so. A more
common situation, and one that this case focuses on, is
where the patient’s consent (speciﬁcally, consent for clin-
icians sharing information with family members) is not
documented or is ambiguous. It may be that the patient
was seen some (in this case, two) years ago, at which
point they agreed to tell their family, but evidently, did
not.66–68 The patient, John, might now be unreachable
or unwilling to return to clinic and waiting for successful
contact could delay care for Jeﬀ. The default position in
general medicine in the UK is to maintain individual
conﬁdentiality – i.e. refrain from sharing any informa-
tion unless it is justiﬁed in the public interest (e.g. pre-
venting serious and imminent harm to others). However,
it is unclear whether FH is suﬃciently serious to meet
this criterion, especially since carrying the LDLR gene
does not always result in having the disease, and the
harm resulting from the disease is not always immediate,
even if risk-reducing interventions might be immediately
available.69 The clinician in the example thus faces a
conﬂict of normative duties. On one hand, she thinks
she ought to respect John’s conﬁdentiality by not shar-
ing with Jeﬀ what she knows. She considers this as pro-
tecting John’s autonomy because he has not given
speciﬁc consent to share the information. On the other
hand, by telling Jeﬀ about the risk and oﬀering him a
test, she has the chance to prevent harm to Jeﬀ, as he
could beneﬁt from an intervention in case of a positive
test result.
An alternative approach to the default position is for
clinicians to employ a relational understanding of
autonomy and a familial approach to conﬁdential-
ity.70,71 Here, genetic information (e.g. that there is an
LDLR mutation in the Smith family) is conceptualised
as ‘belonging’ to both the individual patient and the
family. It is thus considered as conﬁdential at the famil-
ial level. Individual-level information, such as a speciﬁc
patient’s genetic or clinical diagnosis or disease status
(e.g. that John has FH), by contrast, are regarded as
conﬁdential to the individual. This two-tiered approach
to conﬁdentiality is underpinned by an understanding
of autonomy as relational71 also in the sense that inter-
ests and needs of a patient’s family have bearing on
how some information obtained from an individual
patient is handled.
In the context of genetic medicine, Roy Gilbar66 has
made a similar argument. He suggests that, if taking
seriously this relational approach, clinicians will talk
to patients about their family relationships and try to
achieve a good understanding of what these relation-
ships are like – ideally at the time the patient consents
for a genetic test. They could clarify then that as a ser-
vice that oﬀers genetic testing, they would usually share
familial information if it could beneﬁt family mem-
bers.72–74 If the clinician then ends up seeing a family
member of a previously seen patient, they could share
genetic information pertaining to the family without
speciﬁc consent from the original patient. What’s
more, they could do so without disclosing that patient’s
particular genetic or clinical diagnosis or disease status.
By treating this individual-level information as conﬁ-
dential to the individual – i.e. not as part of the infor-
mation belonging to the family – they would be
respecting personal autonomy.75,76
The ethical bases of the familial approach are the
principle of beneﬁcence (here: beneﬁt to the family),
fairness and reciprocity. That is, clinicians will have
asked a patient – John – for information about his rela-
tives’ health to determine his eligibility for a genetic
test. Using the information produced by his test (e.g.
that there is a heritable risk) would be a way to enact
reciprocity towards those relatives who may not have
had the opportunity for a test themselves. Giving John
veto power over the use of this information would be
unfair. The approach emphasises relational values, such
as mutual responsibility (as a manifestation of reci-
procity), and interdependence, in that a patient’s deci-
sion will aﬀect relatives.
The familial approach to conﬁdentiality has received
support from patients30 who argue that genetic infor-
mation is not ‘theirs’, that people have a responsibility
to their family members, and any concerns about
conﬁdentiality are outweighed by the chance to protect
others from harm. By contrast, clinicians have been
shown to be wary of taking the familial approach, des-
pite encouragement from UK clinical genetics guide-
lines.77 A major reason for their hesitation was a
perception that sharing any information would count
as a breach of conﬁdentiality and have legal implica-
tions. Another concern was that sharing genetic infor-
mation might lead to a relative inferring the patient’s
identity. It was also feared that if a patient had delayed
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disclosure due to having a poor relationship with a
relative, this inference could have an unknown, but
potentially damaging, impact on already fragile rela-
tionships.78,79 Indeed, in some cases, personal diag-
noses might be inferred from other circumstances, e.g.
from the fact that a speciﬁc person was referred to gen-
etic testing in the ﬁrst place. If the risk of inference is
high, a clinician might decide not to share the genetic
information. The key diﬀerence between this decision
as reached via the familial approach, versus the indi-
vidual approach to conﬁdentiality, is that nondisclosure
is a considered decision, rather than a reﬂex based on
an assumption that sharing is harmful or undermines
autonomy. A more nuanced and relational approach
might also weigh into the balance that long-held
‘secrets’ can reduce family cohesion and
wellbeing.67,80–83
In sum, the familial approach to conﬁdentiality draws
upon a relational approach to autonomy in that it
encourages clinicians to see their patients as embedded
in a network of others, to critically reﬂect, together with
their patients, on the needs and interests of these others,
and to prominently consider values such as reciprocity
and interdependence. The familial approach to conﬁden-
tiality speciﬁcally and relational approaches to auton-
omy more broadly both respond to a question posed
earlier in this article: does the fear of infringing individ-
ual rights explain why relational autonomy has not had
much impact on clinical practice? The answer, at least in
the clinical genetics context, appears to be yes. Careful
thinking is now required about how to help clinicians
engage with familial and relational approaches in a way
that does not supersede, but instead, complements the
needs and interests of individual patients.
Case 3: Placental sampling
Medical research seeks to understand the causes of
many types of obstetric diseases, including pre-
eclampsia, high blood pressure, diabetes, as well as a
range of other conditions that could lead to complica-
tions of pregnancy or aﬀect the growth and develop-
ment of the unborn baby.84–86 To better understand
why and when complications occur, and how best to
respond to them, researchers may collect biological
samples from women who ﬁt a research study’s eligibil-
ity criteria. Good practice dictates that researchers seek
the informed consent from each pregnant woman prior
to collecting biological samples and relevant data.87–89
This consent also extends to collection of placenta and
cord samples.
A question arises as to what happens if, during the
consent process, a family or couple disagree over
whether to ‘donate’ these samples for research. For
the technical consent requirements, this is irrelevant,
as only the pregnant woman’s view counts. But for
the possibility of obtaining meaningful consent in a
clinical research setting, it matters a lot. For example,
a couple may be approached about a particular obste-
tric-related research study, where biological samples
ideally are to be collected from the pregnant woman
and the postpartum placenta and cord blood. In the
absence of other ways of assessing and documenting
agreement to participate in research, the consent form
is generally accepted as an object indicating under-
standing and willingness to participate in studies. In
some studies, one consent form is required to indicate
maternal consent into the study and to donate her own
biological samples, while a second form is used to indi-
cate consent to ‘donate’ foetal samples. Based on the
clinical experience of one of the authors (MM), most
pregnant women appear happy enough to consent to
participate in the various studies, yet some request time
to discuss the issue with their partner before deciding
whether to consent to donation of foetal samples to the
study. How is a researcher to react when faced with the
latter situation?
During one of the regular recruitment discussions,
for example, a woman who had indicated interest in
taking part, and who signed her consent form, turned
to the researcher and said:
So, you want me to sign the baby into the study? Can
he [indicating her partner] sign it? And if I can with-
draw from the research anytime, does it mean I have to
tell my daughter when she is older that she took part in
research so she can withdraw if she wants?
A second illustration comes from another discussion
with a diﬀerent woman admitted on the antenatal
ward of the hospital. Having read the information leaf-
let, she then asked: ‘I have no problems taking part, but
is it ok if I wait and ask my husband if he is happy for
the baby bit [placenta and cord blood] before I sign it?
It’s his baby too’.
For the clinical researcher, it can be very diﬃcult in
the face of the disagreeing couple or family to respect
only the pregnant woman’s wishes. Often a researcher
feels a sense of obligation to incorporate the viewpoint
of the partner, but it remains unknown as to how
exactly this ‘incorporation’ should be instantiated,
and there is currently no legal obligation for a
researcher to respect the partner’s opinion. In the face
of possible family disharmony, how does one balance
research and possible dissent? If DNA extraction is part
of the research, collecting maternal or foetal DNA
could provide more information about a person’s bio-
logical connections; in these instances, just how indivi-
dualistically autonomous should individuals be in
making these decisions which draw in connected
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others? Researchers are presented a moral dilemma
with no clear answer provided by regulation or even
best practice exemplar. The main problem, here,
seems to be that consent is treated as a decision made
by only one person – the pregnant woman – when it is
very clear in practice that some of these women do not
normally decide, or want to decide, by themselves.
While it may seem tempting to remedy this situation
by requiring the consent of the woman’s partner, this
would open up a whole new range of problems: if the
consent of both parents-to-be were required, pregnant
women might no longer opt for testing against their
partner’s will. Moreover, what should be done in
cases where a pregnant woman does not have a partner,
or does not want to disclose their identity?
A perspective informed by relational autonomy –
namely one that poses emphasis on the web of relations
that a person is part of – could provide a solution to
this dilemma. It would suggest to retain the require-
ment of formal consent only from the pregnant
woman, but to encourage her to discuss this with her
partner and other important people in her life if she
wishes. Moreover, room for joint decision-making
would be built into the consent process. As highlighted
in the previous case study, the circumstances in which
joint decision-making could be pursued are not easy to
determine since the women’s wishes to perhaps not
involve her partner or signiﬁcant family members
must also be respected.
In a minimal form, the latter could be done by asking
the clinical researcher who seeks the consent to discuss
with the woman whom, if anyone, she would like to con-
sult when making this decision, and making adequate
time for this. A more expansive version of relational
autonomy could entail an explicit acknowledgement of
the important role that clinicians and researchers have in
this process. It would give the clinician the mandate to
proactively encourage that women discuss the decision
with signiﬁcant others. One practical step towards this
goal would be to provide training to clinicians and
researchers about the contingencies, relationality and
contextuality of consent, so that they can discuss the
relevance of a situation or issue to a patient’s or research
participant’s signiﬁcant others in a conﬁdent and
nuanced manner, and so that they consider this aspect
as equally important as the collection of data and sam-
ples. Theywould also need to be given adequate time and
ﬂexibility to have discussions, possibly over a longer
period of time, with the patient or participant.
Case 4: Patient access to medical records
In September 2015, during the UK’s National Health
Service (NHS) annual conference, the Secretary of State
for Health, Jeremy Hunt, announced that all patients
within NHS England will be given access to their full
medical records from 2018.90,91 According to Hunt, not
only will patients be able to read the notes written by
their doctors, as well as prescriptions, hospital referrals
and medical tests, they will also be able to contribute to
their records by uploading information from their
mobile phones. This, Hunt argued, will improve health-
care delivery in two ways: it will make patients be more
in control of their health and wellbeing, and it will
reduce mistakes in their medical records as patients
will be able to rectify them. The NHS Patient Online
programme is expected to ‘empower patients to take
greater control of their own health and wellbeing by
increasing online access to services’.d As stated by
Hunt, ‘powerful patients need to know about the qual-
ity of healthcare being provided, but they also need to
be able to harness the many innovations now becoming
possible’.92 The announcement was met with a number
of concerns, mostly regarding the risks of having such
sensitive information available outside the clinical con-
text. Some also mentioned the risk that people in abu-
sive relationships could be coerced or manipulated into
revealing the content of private conversations with their
healthcare professionals to their abusers.93
An important diﬀerence between the optimistic scen-
ario described by Hunt and the more sceptical one
described by his opponents lies in the assumptions
they make. Mr Hunt’s vision assumes that patients
can and should be in control of their own health
through access to their records. These supposedly
empowered patients are independent, autonomous
and rational subjects who should know what is best
for them; access to detailed medical information
empowers them.e As Chiapperino and Tengland
remark,96 NHS England’s rhetoric of empowerment
mobilises a set of values including individual responsi-
bility for disease prevention. While the Royal College
of General Practitioners considers patients to be a vul-
nerable group in need of protection,93 in Hunt’s scen-
ario, patients are empowered individuals in control of
their conditions. The opportunity to access one’s med-
ical records comes with the ability to act on them and
take control. Patient autonomy is both a justifying
value and a guiding value in Hunt’s scenario. The con-
ception of autonomy underlying this scenario is clearly
an individualistic one. It assumes that people are
rational individuals making decisions after processing
all available information.
When we turn to actual practices of patient access,
however, a diﬀerent picture appears.f An example is
Eva’s story. Eva is a young woman aﬀected by several
chronic conditions who has been accessing her full med-
ical records through the Patient Access systemg for sev-
eral years. Her work regularly brings her to remote
rural areas where she does not have access to the
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internet. One time while away, Eva realised that she
would not have any medication left upon returning
home; she called her sister, gave her access details and
asked her to log in to the system to repeat a prescription
for Eva, so that she could pick up the medication as
soon as she returned home. Eva expressed some guilt
about having done this:
I probably shouldn’t, but I have used it by proxy
through her in the past and it’s been useful. [. . .]
Obviously you have to trust someone, but it’s been
useful in the past for her to go and check things for me.
Later in a research interview carried out by one of us
(FL), Eva explained that her concern about giving her
sister the log-in details to access her medical records to
repeat her prescriptions came from thinking about e-
banking where banks repeatedly warn customers not to
share their password with anyone – not even between
spouses. ‘And they make it a really big thing [. . .] So
you get this impression that you shouldn’t share this
information with anyone’, she added. The system
seemed to be designed for the single user – the patient
– to have complete control and access to it. This system
design, however, may not accurately reﬂect the way
things work in practice. Eva has been having access
to her mother and father’s medical records as well, as
they spend part of the year in Spain with very limited
access to the internet. It has happened in the past that
Eva’s mother phoned her and asked her to log in with
her credentials and order her prescribed medicaments.
Their medical care, for both Eva and her family, are
personal, but not individual matters. In Eva’s account,
her medical care and that of her mother are family
matters deﬁned by a mutual ethic of care. Other
patients see it diﬀerently, but for hardly anybody is
medical care a purely individual aﬀair.
The very practices that actual users of direct online
access to medical records mention as one of the most
beneﬁcial aspects of the system are ironically those that
the British Medical Association used to disapprove. In
a 2014 guidance regarding ‘Access to health records’,97
‘[a] next of kin has no rights of access to medical rec-
ords’ (section 4.15). The concern here was that if a
healthcare professional allowed ‘next of kin’ access to
patient medical records, this would lead to a breach of
conﬁdentiality. The guidance did not consider the
option that patients could consciously and autono-
mously desire to share access with others. Equally,
the computer system in Eva’s story seems unable to
recognise the possibility for patients to share access,
information, and perhaps also their worries with con-
nected others.
Stories like Eva’s do not neatly ﬁt into the stereotype
of atomistic individual agents who are – or at least
should be – solipsistically in control of her own
health. Her story oﬀers insight into complex webs of
mutual support, dependence, love, trust, guilt and con-
cern. The autonomy of these patients can only be
understood in its social and intimate relationship with
others. Such a relational aspect is absent from Hunt’s
portrayal of responsible and empowered individual
actors and only partially appears in the Royal College
of General Practitioners’ scenario of vulnerable individ-
uals who need to be protected by clinicians from poten-
tially abusive relationships.
This issue has been addressed recently by the Royal
College of General Practitioners. In late December
2015, they published a new guidance document allow-
ing proxy access to patient online records.98 According
to the guidance, patients may now request that ‘some-
one else, usually a family member, close friend or
carer’, has online access to their GP records as their
proxy ‘to book appointments, order repeat prescrip-
tions for them or to access their detailed care record
on their behalf to assist in their care’.98 The guidance
speciﬁes that patients should be informed about the
dangers and risks of informal proxy access (as in the
case of Eva’s sister who was using Eva’s credentials to
access the system). With formal access, in fact, patients
have to select speciﬁc functions that their proxies are
able to perform, such as booking appointments or
repeating prescriptions, for example, without having
access to detailed care records. They can also monitor
their proxies’ activities and withdraw their access. The
guidance also speciﬁes that if GPs suspect that patients
are consenting to proxy access against their will, they
should ascertain the risk of coercion through a discus-
sion with the patient and may eventually refuse to grant
access.
Seemingly moving beyond previous individual-
centric guidelines and debates, formal proxy access
acknowledges relational aspects in care practices as
part of patient autonomy rather than as a limitation
thereof. Healthcare professionals are encouraged to dis-
cuss the possibility of a family member or friend to
access the patient’s data and evaluate case-by-case
whether relationality should be prioritised to or
balanced with a need to protect vulnerable patients in
case of coercion and potentially abusive relationships.
Patients who sign up for electronic access to health
records have now the possibility to choose whether they
want a trusted friend or family member to have access
to their records, and if so, what activities to be per-
formed. It could be argued that this recent change in
guidance for online access to GP records takes rela-
tional autonomy seriously. A relational approach
allows, in fact, one to justify current practices of care
from family members and friends and acknowledge
that they are carriers and conditions for patients’
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autonomy. This system enacts relational autonomy by
oﬀering the technical possibility for access, and miti-
gates the risk of abuse of privacy or breach of conﬁ-
dentiality that would limit the autonomy of the patient.
Discussion
The case studies discussed in this article suggest that
relational autonomy can oﬀer diﬀerent ways of framing
an issue, and in some cases, can oﬀer new solutions to
practical problems in healthcare and research. In the
ﬁrst case, an understanding of informed consent
emerging from an individualistic understanding of
autonomy appears to be more hindrance than help
in addressing the question of whether and how to re-
contact (former) patients at a later point with new
information about their genetics or health condition.
Reasons for this include that consent cannot, by deﬁn-
ition, be fully informed if patients cannot be asked
about future scenarios for being re-contacted.
Moreover, treating a person’s consent as a decision of
only one person, where medical professionals only pro-
vide non-directive guidance, does not begin to accom-
modate the complex and iterative ways in which such
decisions are made in practice.24 Here, relational auton-
omy can lead to the adoption of a shared decision-
making model, where everybody’s input, and the joint
navigating of high levels of uncertainty, are explicitly
acknowledged. Relational autonomy, based on an ethic
of care and trust, would suggest to include the health-
care professionals in the decision-making processes.
Dheensa and colleagues observe that ﬁndings from
one person’s DNA may have consequences also for
genetically related others (e.g. parents, siblings, chil-
dren): re-contacting is thus not an individual matter
alone.30 As such, the sensitivities involved in familial
situations may make re-contacting undesirable. The
partnership model is designed to put the decision con-
cerning what should trigger a re-contacting event in the
hands of the patient, protecting her autonomy, but also
requiring her to consider the needs and interests of
family members when making that decision.
Many of these conclusions also apply to Case 2.
As more tests that sequence large parts of the genome
are conducted, questions about how to appropriately
share information will become more prominent: not
only because more and more previous test results will
be reinterpreted (leading to potential triggers for re-
contacting), but also because testing relatives and
exploring their signs and symptoms will be increasingly
necessary to make sense of genomic ﬁndings that have
unclear signiﬁcance. Using an individualistic under-
standing of autonomy will be a hindrance not only
for re-contacting, but also in thinking about good
rules for information sharing with family members
when patients are hesitant to do so. Like in our ﬁrst
case, the individualistic approach (which in this case
results in keeping all information conﬁdential to the
individual unless there is speciﬁc documented consent
to share) overlooks the complexity of consent. It places
too much emphasis on the documentation of consent, or
lack thereof, seeing it as the ﬁnal arbiter over what
should happen in practice. If a relational approach
were endorsed and used more widely, it would encour-
age clinicians to see the consent process as a chance to
discuss and explore patients’ familial relationships –
and as we go on to suggest in relation to Case 3,
encourage patients to speak to family members where
appropriate. When faced with a potential non-
disclosure request by patients, a relational approach
would move clinicians away from reﬂexively keeping
all information conﬁdential to the individual for fear
of infringing that individual’s autonomy. Instead, it
would mandate that clinicians encourage patients to
consider what their family members may need and
want. In practice, it would encourage them to separate
information relevant to others from purely personal
information and share the former unless there are
good reasons not to. This approach could lead to famil-
ial beneﬁt and enhanced autonomy of the patients’ web
of relations.
The dilemma in the third case is similar to the
former two. Clinical researchers are legally obliged
to obtain consent only from the woman from whom
the placenta to be analysed comes, and not from a
partner or the other parent of the child. Researchers
may confront the dilemma of deciding whether the
prospective participant’s consent is suﬃcient even if
nobody else’s perspective has been considered, or
deciding upon the circumstances in which the views
of signiﬁcant others should be sought. Relational
autonomy could help with these socio-clinical dilem-
mas. Asking both parents-to-be for their consent does
not seem to be a feasible solution as it would raise
more issues than it would solve, not the least of
which is the pregnant woman’s right to decide what
happens to her body, or the potential for the research
to generate tension or conﬂict between partners and
between consent and veto. A relational autonomy-
based approach, however, could – similar to the ﬁrst
and second cases – explicitly acknowledge that women
often do not make such decisions by themselves, and
that partners, family members, friends and even clin-
icians can be important trusted partners in such deci-
sion-making. In this case, relational autonomy would
also mandate that decision-making on the side of the
woman is not rushed, and adequate time is given for
her to consult with everybody whom she wants – and
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that such engagement is encouraged by healthcare and
research professionals.
In the fourth case, the stories told by patients who
access their medical records online illustrate how their
engagement with their personal medical information is
not an individualistic and solipsistic practice. On the
contrary, some of the greatest beneﬁts seem to manifest
around practices of sharing information and acting for
others. The initial rules and guidelines around individ-
ual access to medical records sat squarely with the
actual practice of use; they assumed that medical
records can only be personal to one person and that
protection of privacy is an unassailable right of individ-
uals. The recently published guidance for formal proxy
access resonates with a relational approach and softens
some of this absolutist and atomistic thinking. By invit-
ing GPs to ascertain whether there is a risk of coercion
for patients by family members or others who want to
access their records, and by enabling patients to moni-
tor the access of their proxies to their records, this
system enacts a relational autonomy-based approach.
At the same time, as instruments are in place for the
patient to retain control over their proxies, patients’
control over their personal medical records does not
disappear; rather, the patient is empowered to share
control through networks of trust and care.
Together, these cases show that in our quest to
enhance the practical value of the concept of relational
autonomy in healthcare and research, we must be care-
ful not to remove the patient or participant from the
centre of decision-making. At the same time, we should
acknowledge that the patient’s decision to consent (or
refuse) to treatment or research can be augmented by
facilitating and encouraging that her relations to, and
responsibility for, others are considered in decision-
making processes. Our case studies do not suggest
that we should expand consent requirements to others
per se, such as family members or community elders –
that is, to add the requirement of seeking consent from
further individuals who may also be seen as having a
stake in the decision. Such a position would undermine
the idea that the person who is centrally aﬀected by a
decision should typically have the ﬁnal say in what hap-
pens with and to her, or her body, or even her data. As
long as this general principle respects all legal excep-
tions (see below), we believe that it is a critical under-
pinning of fundamental respect for persons that should
not done away with. Moreover, expanding consent or
requiring consent to include others (however so
deﬁned) undermines the main objective of relational
autonomy, which is to foreground the relational
aspect of human identities and interests, and not
merely to expand the range of individuals who need
to give consent to a procedure.99 An approach that
merely extends consent requirements to other people
does not foreground relations but rather presumptions
about who the relevant others of a person are.
The version of relational autonomy that we promote
here, on the basis of our case studies, acknowledges the
importance of a person’s relations to her (human)
others in deﬁning who she is and what her needs are;
but it does not abolish the central idea in medicine that
the person whose body is, literally, at stake, typically
needs to have the ﬁnal say in what is done to her. This,
we hasten to add, is a general rather than universal
principle; that the person with and in the body who is
most aﬀected by the medical procedure or research
project should have the ﬁnal say does not mean to chal-
lenge legal provisions regarding exceptions to this prin-
ciple, such as in instances of public health or threats to
the security of others.h Our claim is that relational
autonomy can ﬂourish in clinical practice and research
where space – in law, policy, and practice – is provided
for people to make decisions also on the basis of con-
sidering (or being persuaded but not forced to consider)
consultation with others. In so doing, it allows us to
preserve the person’s decisional freedom but simultan-
eously to recognise that autonomous decisions are
made by people whose identities and interests are
always also shaped by their relations to others.
Conclusion
In this article, we have endeavoured to illustrate a curi-
ous contrast between the rich array of theoretical cri-
tique of individualistic notions of autonomy and the
paucity of alternative forms of autonomy in practice.
It seems that there is a ‘translation gap’ between theor-
etical critique and the development of new approaches
and tools for ethical decision-making in clinical practice
and research. Thus, we presented four case studies as a
way to address a challenging question: what does rela-
tional autonomy actually change in how we frame spe-
ciﬁc ethical problems in clinical practice and research,
or how we address them?
The case studies indicate that relational autonomy
does have a practical role to play in clinical practice and
research. Speciﬁcally, relational autonomy oﬀers
greater analytic and normative value than individualis-
tic autonomy by encouraging wider appreciation of the
socially situated person, whose decisions are shaped by
and consequential for society, and whose interests are
rarely purely self-interested. Such an account of auton-
omy promotes decision-making guided by an ethic of
care and moral responsibility – whereby the person is
respected as an individual but also is encouraged, at
levels of legal architecture and clinical practice, to
take account of her social situation such that she
Dove et al. 161
promotes her own ﬂourishing as well as the ﬂourishing
of her social and natural environment. Whether this re-
conceptualisation of autonomy is taken up in practice
largely will depend on how we – as practitioners, par-
ticipants, patients, policymakers and community mem-
bers – conceive it and what we want it to do. Relational
autonomy changes how we envision self-rule. In the
face of entrenched individualistic neoliberalism,100
there is a growing social sense among some thinkers
and practitioners that the extant paradigm of atomistic
and rational self-rule must be supplemented with (but
not necessarily replaced by) recognition of the realities
of our connected, other-regarding selves,30,31 emotional
and care-oriented dispositions, and the relations we
have with those around us. Importantly, it resists a
view in which society consists mostly of individuals
exercising their autonomy independent of each other;
instead, it embraces collective forms of decision-making
and oversight in many contexts. The ongoing challenge
has been to instantiate this realisation into practice, and
to debate the proper contours of or balance between
personal choice and societal concern.
Indeed, what we ﬁnd upon analysing the case studies
is that if relational autonomy is conceived as capacity
for self-rule that is (in)formed by relations with, care
for, and moral responsibility to one’s informational,
natural and/or contextual environments, a space is pro-
vided for its instantiation in healthcare and research,
albeit one that must be continuously negotiated by the
polity to determine where its contours should lie. The
case studies suggest that although for many of us, our
most important others are family, enacting relational
autonomy does not mean that we automatically include
family members in decision-making as equals to our-
selves. Such an approach would risk that the voices of
patients or research participants are merely replaced by
those of others. We must be vigilant to potential power
imbalances and inequity in any autonomy paradigm,
and a mere extension of personal autonomy to the
familial would render people vulnerable to the eﬀects
of such power imbalances. But because most of us
simply do not envisage ourselves as independent deci-
sion-making machines with inviolable rights to access
or control ‘our’ data, tissue or bodies alone, especially
when that data, tissue, and even our body has real and
symbolic meaning for others, autonomy is most useful
as an ethical norm when we recognise that it does not
mean simply being left alone to decide. For it is often in
these messy grey zones of in-betweenness and hybridity
where the impact of our decisions on others is not only
contemplated but valued, that the truest expression of
self-rule is manifest. Law and ethics alike must be
emboldened to acknowledge the messy grey zones of
in-betweenness and hybridity, where participants and
patients think and act interdependently,
compassionately, emotionally, irrationally and ration-
ally, and often, conﬂictedly.
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Notes
a. The other three clinical ethics principles identified by
Beauchamp and Childress are, as many readers know,
non-maleficence, beneficence and justice.
b. Social science scholars who use participatory research
designs, interpretive qualitative methods and other tools
that foreground personal meaning and social practices
instead of studying opinions and behaviours employ the
latter approach.46,47 The concepts and methodologies that
they use are – explicitly or implicitly – shaped by the com-
mitment that the relational nature of human existence
must have an effect on how we study the practices, inter-
ests and institutions in our societies. Scholars in the afore-
mentioned tradition of rational choice, in contrast, treat
social practices as composites of individual behaviour, and
the autonomous individual as the paradigmatic analytic
unit of social and political action, as well as the appropri-
ate ‘rights-bearing’ agent in law.
c. Information on the project can be found here: http://
socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/sociology/research/projects/
details/index.php?id¼409.
d. This slogan can be found with slightly different wording in
NHS England communication material (e.g. flyers, web-
sites, slides). See e.g. https://www.england.nhs.uk/our-
work/pe/patient-online/about-the-prog/po-public/ and
http://www.ipswichandeastsuffolkccg.nhs.uk/Portals/1/
Content/News%20and%20events/Stakeholder%20news-
letter/CCGNewsEngage%20Winter15-16%20no13.pdf.
e. The Health and Care Act 2012 and the NHS (England)
Constitution (last updated in July 2015) emphasise the
importance of patients’ participation in healthcare as a
way to empower them. The UK government white
papers, Personalised Health and Care 202094 and Five
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Year Forward View,95 restate the importance of patients’
involvement and emphasise the role of digital systems
towards this goal.
f. These stories have been extrapolated from 25 in-depth
interviews conducted by one of us (FL) with patients in a
GP surgery in England that actively promotes patients’
registration to the online system for access to their full
medical records. Interviews were conducted between June
and September 2015.
g. Patient Access is one of the online services for patients to
access their medical records and other online systems at
their local practices (including arranging appointments,
repeat medication and secure messages). This service is
provided by EMIS Health, which is the main provider of
clinical systems for practices in England. Patients can con-
nect to their practice’s EMIS clinical system through
Patient Access. Rival clinical computer systems, like
SystemOne developed by TPT, offer their own online sys-
tems for patients.
h. Various legal cases and statutes address exceptional situ-
ations where a person’s autonomy may be curtailed
(including reasonable expectations of confidentiality),
most often for reasons of public health and safety (e.g.
threat of serious harm to others). See e.g. in the United
States: Tarasoff v Regents of the University of California,
131 Cal Rptr 14 (Cal 1976); Safer v Pack, 677 A2d 1188
(NJ Super Ct App Div 1996); in the United Kingdom:
Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984; National
Assistance Act 1948.
References
1. Beauchamp TL and Childress JF. Principles of Biomedical
Ethics, 7th ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
2. Macfarlane A. The Origins of English Individualism: The
Family, Property and Social Transition. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1978.
3. Dworkin G. The Theory and Practice of Autonomy.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
4. Wolpe PR. The triumph of autonomy in American med-
ical ethics: a sociological view. In: De Vries R and Subedi J
(eds) Bioethics and Society: Sociological Investigations of
the Enterprise of Bioethics. New York: Prentice Hall, 1998.
5. Churchill LR. Toward a more robust autonomy: revising
the Belmont Report. In: Childress JF, Meslin EM and
Shapiro HT (eds) Belmont Revisited: Ethical Principles
for Research with Human Subjects. Washington, DC:
Georgetown University Press, 2005.
6. Foster C. Choosing Life, Choosing Death: The Tyranny of
Autonomy in Medical Ethics and Law. Oxford: Hart, 2009.
7. Cohen JL. Configuring the Networked Self: Law, Code and
the Play of Everyday Practice. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2012.
8. Koenig BA. Have we asked too much of consent? Hastings
Cent Rep 2014; 44: 33–34.
9. Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military
Tribunals under Control Council Law No 10, Vol 2,
pp 181–182 (Nuremberg Code). Washington, DC: US
Government Printing Office, 1949.
10. Schloendorff v New York General Hospital (1914) 105 NE
92.
11. Levine RL. Ethics and Regulation of Clinical Research,
2nd ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988.
12. Katz J. The Silent World of Doctor and Patient.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002 [1984].
13. King JS and Moulton BW. Rethinking informed consent:
the case for shared medical decision-making. Am J Law
Med 2006; 32: 429–501.
14. Thomasa DC. Beyond medical paternalism and patient
autonomy: a model of physician conscience for the phy-
sician-patient relationship. Ann Intern Med 1983; 98:
243–248.
15. Whitbeck C. A different reality: feminist ontology.
In: Gould CC (ed.) Beyond Domination: New
Perspectives on Women and Philosophy. Totowa, NJ:
Rowman and Allanheld, 1983.
16. Taylor C. Philosophical Papers. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985.
17. Mackenzie C and Stoljar N (eds) Relational Autonomy:
Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the
Social Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
18. Donchin A. Understanding autonomy relationally:
toward a reconfiguration of bioethical principles. J Med
Philos 2001; 26: 365–386.
19. Christman J. Relational autonomy, liberal individualism,
and the social constitution of selves. Philos Stud 2004;
117: 143–164.
20. Fineman MA. The Autonomy Myth: Lies We Tell
Ourselves about Dependency and Self-Sufficiency. New
York: The New Press, 2004.
21. Prainsack B. The we in the me: Solidarity and healthcare
in the era of personalised medicine. Sci Technol Human
Values, (2017).
22. Priaulx N. The ethics of care: Resetting our social ‘oper-
ating system’ after rational man 2.0 and sorting out what
we care about. In: Priaulx N and Wrigley A (eds) Ethics,
Law and Society. Vol. V, Farnham: Ashgate, 2013.
23. Koenig BA and Gates-Williams J. Understanding cul-
tural difference in caring for dying patients. West J
Med 1995; 163: 114–128.
24. Prainsack B. Personalized Medicine: Empowered Patients
in the 21st Century. New York: New York University
Press, (2017).
25. Gilbar R and Miola J. One size fits all? On patient auton-
omy, medical decision-making, and the impact of culture.
Med Law Rev 2015; 23: 375–399.
26. McLean SAM. Autonomy, Consent and the Law.
Abingdon: Routledge, 2010.
27. Chadwick R. The communitarian turn: myth or reality?
Camb Q Healthc Ethics 2011; 20: 546–553.
28. Gilbar R. The passive patient and disclosure of genetic
information: can English tort law protect the relatives’
right to know? Int J Law Policy Family 2016; 30: 79–104.
29. Nys T. Autonomy, trust, and respect. J Med Philos 2016;
41: 10–24.
30. Dheensa S, Fenwick A and Lucassen A. ‘Is this
knowledge mine and nobody else’s? I don’t feel that.’
Patient views about consent, confidentiality and
Dove et al. 163
information-sharing in genetic medicine. J Med Ethics
2016; 42: 174–179.
31. Jennings B. Reconceptualizing autonomy: a relational
turn in bioethics. Hastings Cent Rep 2016; 46: 11–16.
32. Mill JS. On Liberty, Utilitarianism and Other Essays, 2nd
ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
33. Berlin I. Two concepts of liberty. In: Berlin I and Hardy
H (eds) Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002
[1958].
34. Jonsen A. The Birth of Bioethics. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003.
35. Fox RC and Swazey JP. Observing Bioethics. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2008.
36. Maclean A. Autonomy, Informed Consent and Medical
Law: A Relational Challenge. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009.
37. O’Neill O. Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002.
38. Taylor JS. Autonomy and informed consent: a much mis-
understood relationship. J Value Inq 2004; 38: 383–391.
39. Spatz ES, Krumholz HM and Moulton BW. The new era
of informed consent: getting to a reasonable-patient
standard through shared decision making. JAMA 2016;
315: 2063–2064.
40. Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC
11.
41. Herring J. Medical Law and Ethics, 6th ed. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2016.
42. Lo˜hmus K. Caring Autonomy: European Human Rights
Law and the Challenge of Individualism. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2015.
43. World Medical Association. Declaration of Helsinki. 64th
WMA General Assembly, Fortaleza, Brazil, October
2013.
44. Baylis F, Kenny NP and Sherwin S. A relational account
of public health ethics. Public Health Ethics 2008; 1:
196–209.
45. Nedelsky J. Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self,
Autonomy, and Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2011.
46. Fay B. Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science: A
Multicultural Approach. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996.
47. Wagenaar H. Meaning in Action: Interpretation and
Dialogue in Policy Analysis. London: Routledge, 2014.
48. Gilligan C. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and
Women’s Development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1982.
49. Ruddick S. Maternal thinking. In: Thorne B and Yalom
M (eds) Rethinking the Family: Some Feminist Questions.
New York: Longman, 1982.
50. Noddings N. Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and
Moral Education. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1984.
51. Kuhse H. Caring: Nurses, Women and Ethics. Oxford:
Blackwell, 1997.
52. Kittay EF. Love’s Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and
Dependency. New York: Routledge, 1999.
53. MacDonald C. Nurse autonomy as relational. Nurs
Ethics 2002; 9: 194–201.
54. Gilbar R. Family involvement, independence, and patient
autonomy in practice. Med Law Rev 2011; 19: 192–234.
55. Ho A. Relational autonomy or undue pressure? Family’s
role in medical decision-making. Scand J Caring Sci 2008;
22: 128–135.
56. Mackenzie C. Relational autonomy, normative authority
and perfectionism. J Soc Philos 2008; 39: 512–533.
57. Adorno R. The right not to know: an autonomy based
approach. J Med Ethics 2004; 30: 435–439.
58. Chadwick R, Levitt M and Shickle D (eds) The Right to
Know and the Right Not to Know: Genetic Privacy and
Responsibility, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2014.
59. Hirschhorn K, Fleisher LD, Godmilow L, et al. Duty to
re-contact. Genet Med 1999; 1: 171–172.
60. Richards CS, Bale S, Bellissimo DB, et al. ACMG rec-
ommendations for standards for interpretation and
reporting of sequence variations: Revisions 2007. Genet
Med 2008; 10: 294–300.
61. Pyeritz RE. The coming explosion in genetic testing – is
there a duty to recontact? N Engl J Med 2011; 365:
1367–1369.
62. Carrieri D, Lucassen AM, Clarke AJ, et al. Recontact in
clinical practice: a survey of clinical genetics services in
the United Kingdom. Genet Med 2016; 18: 876–881.
63. Kelly SE, Spector TD, Cherkas LF, et al. Evaluating the
consent preferences of UK research volunteers for genetic
and clinical studies. PLoS One 2015; 10: e0118027.
64. Laurie G. Privacy and the right not to know: a plea for
conceptual clarity. In: Chadwick R, Levitt M and Shickle
D (eds) The Right to Know and the Right Not to Know:
Genetic Privacy and Responsibility, 2nd ed. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2014.
65. Clarke A, Richards M, Kerzin-Storrar L, et al. Genetic
professionals’ reports of nondisclosure of genetic risk
information within families. Eur J Hum Genet 2005; 13:
556–562.
66. Gilbar R. Communicating genetic information in the
family: the familial relationship as the forgotten factor.
J Med Ethics 2007; 33: 390–393.
67. Gilbar R. Medical confidentiality and communication
with the patient’s family: legal and practical perspectives.
Child Family Law Q 2012; 24: 199–222.
68. Hodgson J and Gaff C. Enhancing family communica-
tion about genetics: ethical and professional dilemmas.
J Genet Couns 2013; 22: 16–21.
69. General Medical Council (GMC). Confidentiality.
London: General Medical Council, 2009.
70. O’Donovan K and Gilbar R. The loved ones: families,
intimates and patient autonomy. Leg Stud (Soc Leg
Scholars) 2003; 23: 332–358.
71. Foster C, Herring J and Boyd M. Testing the limits of the
‘joint account’ model of genetic information: a legal
thought experiment. J Med Ethics 2015; 41: 379–382.
72. Lucassen A and Hall A. Consent and confidentiality in
clinical genetic practice: guidance on genetic testing and
sharing genetic information. Clin Med (Lond) 2012; 12:
5–6.
73. Doukas DJ and Berg JW. The family covenant and gen-
etic testing. Am J Bioeth 2001; 1: 2–10.
164 Clinical Ethics 12(3)
74. Macklin R. Privacy and control of genetic information.
In: Annas GJ and Elias S (eds) Gene Mapping: Using Law
and Ethics as Guides. New York: Oxford University Press,
1992.
75. Parker M and Lucassen A. Genetic information: a joint
account? BMJ 2004; 329: 165–167.
76. Lucassen A and Parker M. Confidentiality and sharing
genetic information with relatives. Lancet 2010; 375:
1507–1509.
77. Joint Committee on Medical Genetics. Consent and
Confidentiality in Genetic Practice. London: Royal
College of Physicians and Royal College of
Pathologists, 2011.
78. Dheensa S, Fenwick A, Shkedi-Rafid S, et al. Health-care
professionals’ responsibility to patients’ relatives in gen-
etic medicine: a systematic review and synthesis of empir-
ical research. Genet Med 2016; 18: 290–301.
79. Dheensa S, Fenwick A and Lucassen A. Approaching
confidentiality at a familial level in genomic medicine: a
focus group study with healthcare professionals. BMJ
Open 2017; 7: e012443.
80. Forrest K, Simpson SA, Wilson BJ, et al. To tell or not to
tell: barriers and facilitators in family communication
about genetic risk. Clin Genet 2003; 64: 317–326.
81. Klitzman RL. Am I My Genes? Confronting Fate and
Family Secrets in the Age of Genetic Testing. New
York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
82. Metcalfe A, Plumridge G, Coad J, et al. Parents’ and
children’s communication about genetic risk: a qualita-
tive study, learning from families’ experiences. Eur J Hum
Genet 2011; 19: 640–646.
83. Vavolizza RD, Kalia I, Erskine Aaron K, et al.
Disclosing genetic information to family members about
inherited cardiac arrhythmias: An obligation or a choice?
J Genet Couns 2015; 24: 608–615.
84. Garnica AD and Chan WY. The role of the placenta in
fetal nutrition and growth. J Am Coll Nutr 1996; 15:
206–222.
85. Roberts JM and Escudero C. The placenta in preeclamp-
sia. Pregnancy Hypertens 2012; 2: 72–83.
86. Ryan JG, Davis RK and Bloch JR. The placenta as a
research biospecimen. J Obstet Gynecol Neonatal Nurs
2012; 41: 834–845.
87. International Conference on Harmonisation. Guideline
for Good Clinical Practice E6(R1), http://www.ich.org/
fileadmin/Public_Web_Site/ICH_Products/Guidelines/
Efficacy/E6/E6_R1_Guideline.pdf (1996, accessed 19
January 2017).
88. Macklin R. The art of medicine: enrolling pregnant
women in biomedical research. Lancet 2010; 375:
632–633.
89. Human Tissue Authority. Code of Practice and
Standards E: Research and Standards, https://www.hta.
gov.uk/sites/default/files/Code%20E%20-%
20Research%20Final.pdf (2017, accessed 4 April 2017).
90. NHS England. The forward view into action: planning
for 2014, https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2014/12/forward-view-plning.pdf (accessed 19
January 2017).
91. Campbell D. Doctors voice concerns over plan for
greater patient access to medical records. The Guardian
(2 September 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/soci-
ety/2015/sep/02/doctors-doubts-plan-patient-access-med-
ical-records (accessed 19 January 2017).
92. National Information Board and National Data
Guardian. Health Secretary outlines vision for use of
technology across NHS, https://www.gov.uk/govern-
ment/news/health-secretary-outlines-vision-for-use-of-
technology-across-nhs (accessed 19 January 2017).
93. The Pharmaceutical Journal. Patient access to medical
records: proceed with caution (10 September 2015),
http://www.pharmaceutical-journal.com/opinion/editorial/
patient-access-to-medical-records-proceed-with-caution/
20069300.article (accessed 19 January 2017).
94. National Information Board and Department of Health
(England). Personalised health and care 2020 – using
data and technology to transform outcomes for patients
and citizens: a framework for action, https://www.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/384650/NIB_Report.pdf (accessed 19 January
2017).
95. NHS England. Five year forward view, https://www.eng
land.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/5yfv-web.pdf
(accessed 19 January 2017).
96. Chiapperino L and Tengland PA. Empowerment in
healthcare policy making: three domains of substantive
controversy. Health Promot J Austr 2015; 26: 210–215.
97. British Medical Association. Access to health records:
Guidance for health professionals in the United
Kingdom, http://www.bma.org.uk/-/media/files/pdfs/
practical%20advice%20at%20work/ethics/accessto-
healthrecords_aug2014.pdf (accessed 19 January 2017).
98. Royal College of General Practitioners and NHS
England. Online services: Proxy access guidance for gen-
eral practice, http://elearning.rcgp.org.uk/pluginfile.
php/74124/mod_folder/content/0/PatientOnline-
ProxyAccess-guidance.pdf (accessed 19 January 2017).
99. Stoljar N. Informed consent and relational conceptions
of autonomy. J Med Philos 2011; 36: 375–384.
100. Dickenson D.MeMedicine vs. We Medicine: Reclaiming
Biotechnology for the Common Good. New York:
Columbia University Press, 2013.
Dove et al. 165
